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NOTES
CONTRACTORS' PROBLEMS UNDER THE STANDARDIZED
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
The business activities of the United States Government have be-
come a pervasive element of the nation's economy' and find manifestation
in Government loans,' corporations,' employment,4 business supervision,5
and contracts.6 These activities vitally affect the individual and, ac-
cordingly, necessitate constant efforts to achieve and maintain a judicious
adjustment of interests. The area of Government' contracts exemplifies
a failure to assure private parties adequate protection.
The compass of the Government as a contracting party is illustrated
by the statistic that in 1952 over 42 billion dollars were spent by the
Federal Government for public construction.' Add to this the amounts
expended in purchase and service contracts, and the Government contract
entity develops into enormous proportions.
1. "The growing role played by governmental activity in America's development
is one of the most striking aspects of her history. From the provision of a few minimum
essential services governmental functions have grown to the point where they touch
virtually every phase of an individual's life." WILLIAMSON, THE GROWTH OF THE Ammz-
cAN ECONOMY 925 (2d ed. 1951). In 1953 the Federal Government's expenditures were
about 75,000,000,000 dollars while the gross national product was 367,200,000,000 dollars.
SURVEY OF CURRENT BusiNEss 12 (U. S. Treasury Dept., March 1954).
2. The Government functions both as a lender and a borrower. Many Govern-
mental agencies-whether within the executive department, organized as a corporation,
or set up as an independent administrative agency-engage in making loans. For ex-
ample, a selected list includes the Commodity Credit Corporation, Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation, Housing and Home Finance Agency, Production and Marketing
Administration, and Veterans' Administration. As a borrower the Federal Government
has a public debt of about 265,000,000,000 dollars. TREASURY BULLETIN 10 (U. S. Treas-
ury Dept., March 1954).
3. For a discussion of the Government corporation and its status in relation to con-
tract law, see Note, 6 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 489 (1938).
4. Federal employment of civilians in 1952 averaged throughout the year at about
2,765,000. MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 327 (U. S. Dept. of Labor, March 1954).
5. Into this classification could be placed many instances of Government influence
that do not fit into other broad categories. The Federal Reserve System and the Grants-
in-Aid program serve as examples.
6. Public contracts may be divided into four convenient categories: (1) construc-
tion contracts; (2) purchase contracts; (3) service contracts; (4) leases and privileges
in public property. In this note primary discussion revolves around the Government
construction contract. Much of what is said, however, applies equally well to the other
types.
7. The word "Government" as used in this note refers to the Federal Government.
Related problems, of course, do exist in the area of state government but this discussion
is restricted to operations on a national level.
8. CONSTRUCTION 11 (U. S. Dept. of Labor, February 1954). In 1953 the amount
spent fell to 2,823,000,000 dollars.
NOTES
When a party contracts with the National Government, he enters into
an agreement with a sovereign, and the well-known adage applies that
the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.' The Government gave
the requisite approval concerning contract claims in the Tucker Act of
1887,"0 but this same statute has been interpreted as a limitation that
precludes recovery on contracts implied in law. 1 Jurisdiction in these
cases is vested concurrently in the Court of Claims12 and the district
9. Maricopa County, Arizona v. Valley National Bank of Phoenix, 318 U.S. 357
(1943) ; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 266 (U.S. 1821). Prior to broad Congressional
authorization which permitted contract suits against the Government and provided a
forum, recourse to Congress was the sole remedy for aggrieved contractors. Carusi,
Government Contracts, 43 Am. L. Rxv. 161 (1909). For a historical discussion of suits
against the Government on contract claims, see Naylor, Liability of the United States in
Contract, 14 TULANE L. REv. 580 (1940). Even today Congress may provide special
legislation to relieve contractors. See for a brief discussion, Note, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 500,
506-507 (1946). For a general study of the liability of Government on contract claims,
see Notes, 27 IND. L.J. 279 (1952) ; 31 CORNEL L.Q. 500 (1946).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. 1952). The Act after amendments now reads:
"The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against
the United States:
"(4) Founded upon any express or implied contract with the United States ..
Though a suit may be brought and carried to judgment in the Court of Claims, or
a district court where such court has jurisdiction, it is to be remembered that Congress
still controls the purse strings. See Naylor, supra note 9, at 583. This carries special
weight when it is remembered that relief available in these cases is restricted to mone-
tary judgments. United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1 (1889).
11. United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Co., 271 U.S. 212 (1926);
Gazda v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 516 (Ct. Cl. 1952) ; Dept. of Water and Power of
Los Angeles v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 72 (1945). In one case the Government paid
the prime upon default by the Government $3.20 per unit for the benefit of a sub-
contractor. The prime misrepresented the amount recovered and settled with the sub
for $2.50 per unit. The Government sued and recovered the $.70 difference per unit.
The sub sued the Government to recover this amount arguing that the Government held
the money as trustee, but the court denied recovery. Merritt v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl.
371 (1923), affl'd, 267 U.S. 338 (1925).
In Braun v. United States, 46 F. Supp. 993, 1005 (Ct. Cl. 1942) the Court of Claims
said, "Whether in equity and good conscience on the basis of a quasi-contract, that is, an
obligation solely implied in law and not in fact, the plaintiffs should be paid the balance
of the overpayment . . .is a matter solely for the decision of Congress."
However, it appears ". . . that the court has at times, for obvious reasons, found an
implied contract in a situation which would normally be regarded as giving rise at most
to a quasi-contract." Grismore, Contracts with the United States, 22 MicHi. L. REv. 749,
757 (1924).
There has been criticism of the Government for refusing to be held liable on con-
tracts implied in law. "It is difficult to justify on principle the government's unwilling-
ness in normal times to hold itself accountable to the full standard of fairness and
morality to which private parties are held." Anderson, Tort and Implied Contract Lia-
bility of the Federal Government, 30 MiNN. L. REv. 133, 138 (1946).
Where a contract does exist but no mention is made as to compensation, the court
will imply an amount based on quantum ineruit. Reid Wrecking Co. v. United States, 55
Ct. Cl. 453 (1920).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1952).
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courts." Where legislative mandate is reticent, general contract law
governs 14-- at least this concept is true as an abstract proposition. Prac-
tically, however, in addition to statutes, 5 numerous regulations"0 and
exceptions 7 to contract law significantly affect the contractual relation-
ship.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1952).
It was argued in the dissenting opinion in United States v. Jones that the Act of
1887 which extended jurisdiction to the district courts also broadened considerably the
remedies available against the Government ". . . to meet all such cases in law, equity
and admirality, against the United States, as would be cognizable in such courts against
individuals." United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1, 20 (1889). The majority rejected this
idea, holding that only a nev forum was provided.
14. Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947) ; United States v. Atlantic
Dredging Co., 253 U.S. 1 (1920); The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666 (U.S. 1869).
One commentator stated: ". .. [W]here such contracts [in which the government
is a party] are made, and governmental immunity from suit is waived, the United States
is subject to the same rights and responsibilities as the individuals who are parties to
such instruments. In other words, the same acts or omissions which constitute a breach
of contract by an individual constitute a breach when done or omitted by the government."
Naylor, supra note 9, at 584.
It is still uncertain whether state law or federal law governs, though it appears the
latter is the sounder view, otherwise state legislatures could thwart Government projects.
Anderson, supra note 11, at 136; see also, Pofcher, The Choice of Law, State or Federal,
in Cases Involving Government Contracts, 12 LA. L. REv. 37 (1951). One writer ques-
tions whether local law should apply even in cases involving subcontractors and the
prime, especially where the sub recovers from the prime before the prime recovers from
the Government. Feldman, The Subcontractor's Relationship to the Government, 12 FFD.
B.J. 299, 308-309 (1952).
At least one authority, however, suggests that state law may apply where a Govern-
ment contract is involved. Nemmers, The Problem of Government Liability to Sub-
contractors under Terminated CPFF Prime Contracts-The Third Party Beneficiary
Theory, 31 VA. L. Rav. 161, 162-164 (1944).
15. For example, some statutes that affect the contractual relationship are: 65
STAT. 7 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1211, et seq. (1952) ; 62 STAT. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. §§
151-161 (1952) ; 63 STAT. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. §§ 252-260 (1952) ; 65 STAT. 41 (1951),
41 U.S.C. § 15 (1952); 62 STAT. 989 (1948), 40 U.S.C. § 276c (1952); 63 STAT. 1024
(1949), 41 U.S.C. § lOa-10d (1952). This list includes only a sample of recent amend-
ments and is simply suggestive of the complexity of having to keep abreast of the various
statutory changes.
16. Construing the term "regulation" loosely, this would include decisions of the
Comptroller General, executive orders, and departmental regulations. All of these are
issued from time to time and do have their effect on the contractual relationship. Such
"regulations" may be directed toward particular contract clauses or toward the authority
of the Government's representatives to enter into contracts. Though such information
is available to the public in the Code of Federal Regulations, Federal Register, Decisions
of the Comptroller General and related publications, it is a specialist's task to stay well
informed.
17. For example, a plaintiff cannot sue the Government just to collect nominal
damages. Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935). An injunction does not lie
against the United States even when the United States comes into court to sue on a
claim and the defendant then argues that by suing in court the Government subjects it-
self to being enjoined. United States v. Patterson, 206 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1953). The
statute of limitations does not run against the Government. United States v. Nashville
C. & St. L. R.R., 118 U.S. 120 (1885). Ostensible authority of an agent is not enough
to bind the Government; actual authority is required. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v.
Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
NOTES
The Government's conventional contracting procedure is to enter an
agreement with a prime who, in turn, subcontracts most phases of the
job. 8 This practice is extensive; in the construction industry, for ex-
ample, the erection of a simple dwelling may require as many as 20 sub-
contracts. 9 Frequently, these secondary agreements extend below one
tier which makes a subcontractor a prime contractor for another sub.
In dealings with the Government's representative a private contractor
often finds himself in a helplessly poor bargaining position." Such a
one-sided contractual relationship is referred to as a "contract of ad-
hesion."' The Government, by utilizing advantageously its superior
bargaining position, is able to insert clauses in the contract providing thht
any disputes arising under the contract are to be adjusted by a Govern-
For a general discussion of these exceptions see Mitchell, The Treatment of Public
Contracts it the United States, 9 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 194, 237-249 (1952) ; Thurlow, Some
Aspects of the Law of Government Contracts, 21 CRI-KENT L. REv. 300 (1943).
18. "Usually a general contractor will himself perform only a few of these special-
ties-ordinarily those of a structural character, such as bricklaying, carpentry, and con-
crete work-and will handle the remainder through subcontracts. In some cases prac-
tically the entire work will be sublet, the general contractor providing only coordination
and supervisory services." COLEAN AND NEWcomB, STABILIZING CONSTRUCrION: THE
REcoRD AND POTENTIAL 97 (1st ed. 1952).
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation, which was issued pursuant to the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 62 STAT. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. §§ 151-161
(1952), defines the term "subcontract" as ". . . any contract, agreement, or purchase
order, and any preliminary contractual instrument, other than a prime contract, calling
for the performance of any work, or for the making or furnishing of any material, re-
quired for the performance of any one or more prime contracts. The term also includes
any such contract, agreement, purchase order or other instrument placed under any one
or more subcontracts as defined in this section." 32 CODE FED. REGS. § 407.227 (Cum.
Supp. 1953).
19. The construction of a multi-story apartment building may utilize as many as
fifty-three possible subcontracts. COLEAN AND NEWcOMB, op. cit. supra note 18, at 276-278.
20. The Government's standard construction contract, form 23A, and standard
supply contract, form 32, preclude much negotiation on many points. Even where
negotiation of certain discretionary provisions is allowed, the contractor still faces various
statutes and regulations which restrict the negotiations. Often, too, the contractor is not
represented by legal counsel and as a result will lose advantages that might have been
obtained had he known the correct method of approach. See Moss and vomBaur, Govern-
inent Contracts and the Practice of Law, 20 J.B.A.D.C. 534 (1953). The authors stress
the point that the extreme complexity of contracting with the Government requires ex-
pert legal advice, in contrast with today's frequent utilization of non-legal advisors. See
also, Schultz, Proposed Changes in Government Contract Disputes Settlement: The Leg-
islative Battle over the Wumderlich Case, 67 HARv. L. REv. 217, 248 (1953).
21. This phrase was coined by Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy,
33 HARV. L. REv. 198, 222 (1919). For a more complete discussion of the "contract of
adhesion" and its relationship to the court system and general contract law, see Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COL. L. REv. 629,
635 (1943). See also Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553 (1933) ; Issacs,
The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917) ; Sales, Standard Form Con-
tracts, 16 MOD. L. REv. 318 (1953).
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ment contracting officer 2--an agent of the same party who dictates the
terms of the agreement."2 Since many of these officials are not ex-
perts,24 the prime bears great risks that they may abuse their discretion
in demanding alterations or settling disagreements and, consequently, may
fail to adjust adequately the amounts due him. The contractor, theoreti-
cally of course, may reject the Government's contractual offer;25 real-
22. The four clauses in point can be termed the "changes," "changed conditions,"
"extras," and "disputes" provisions.
Part of the "changes" provision reads: "The Contracting Officer may at any
time . . . make changes in the drawings and/or specifications of this contract and within
the general scope thereof. If such changes cause an increase or decrease in the amount
due under this contract, or in the time required for its performance, an equitable adjust-
ment shall be made. . . . If the parties fail to agree upon the adjustment to be made the
dispute shall be determined as provided in Clause 6 hereof." Standard Form 23A, Article
3. "Clause 6" is the disputes clause.
The "changed conditions" section states, in part: "The Contracting Officer shall
promptly investigate . . . and if he finds that such conditions do so materially differ and
cause an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time required for, performance of this
contract, an equitable adjustment shall be made and the contract modified in writing
accordingly." Standard Form 23A, Article 4. Any dispute that arises is referred to the
disputes clause.
The "extras" clause reads: "Except as otherwise provided in this contract, no pay-
ment for extras shall be made unless such extras and the price therefor have been author-
ized in writing by the Contracting Officer." Standard Form 32, Article 3.
For an excellent discussion of the "changes," "changed conditions," and "extras"
clauses, see Anderson, Changes, Chanded Conditions and Extras in Government Contract-
ing, 42 ILL. L. REv. 29 (1947).
The "disputes" provision reads, in part: "Except as otherwise provided in this con-
tract, any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract which is not
disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer. . . ." Standard
Form 23A, Article 6. Appeal is provided to the head of the department and, finally, a
review by the courts is permitted.
This clause has caused great difficulty recently. Communication to the Indiana Law
Journal from the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. indicates that it is the
most troublesome contract provision faced by construction contractors. See for discus-
sions of this problem Anderson, The Disputes Article in Government Contracts, 44 MIcH.
L. REV. 211 (1945) ; Mulligan, The Disputes Clause of the Government Construction Con-
tract: Its Misconstruction, 27 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 167 (1952) ; Schultz, supra note 20.
Since United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951), legislative action has culminated
in Pub. L. No. 356, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 11, 1954).
23. The Supreme Court has drawn no distinction between third party arbiters
selected by mutual consent of private contracting parties and a contracting officer selected
by the Government. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 215. Ordinarily, arbitration may not
be employed when the Government is a party to the contract. Id. at 217-221. See
Braucher, Arbitration Under Government Contracts, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 473
(1952). For a recent case upholding arbitration, see Grant Construction Co. v. United
States, 109 F. Supp. 245 (Ct. Cl. 1953), 53 COL. L. REv. 879.
24. For example, no professional standards or discipline exist. One writer vividly
describes the contracting officer as ". . . a ubiquitous character. He may be a Reserve
or Regular Army officer, or a civilian governmental employee. His background may be
engineering, business, or nothing even slightly related to the contract in question. One
contracting officer has described his job as a combination of 'accountant-auditor-engineer-
business man.'" Schultz, supra note 20, at 224 n.27.
25. "Looking at the matter dispassionately, the contractor, before entering into the
contract with the government, knows, or could know, the differences in contract law
between private individuals, and the law as it relates to the government, and if he never-
NOTES
istically, however, such action is improbable because these contracts are
appealing transactions. The possibility of benefits seem to counterpoise
the undesirable provisions.
Private contractors, in addition to being confronted with the Govern-
ment-dictated contract, encounter a second, equally harassing obstacle.
The courts are extremely solicitous of the Government's interest and,
though enunciating conformance to general contract law, are prone to
find exceptions which extend to the Government preferential considera-
tion.20  Thus, they interpret the contract in favor of the party who made
it, contrary to the common practice of construing it against such a party.
The explanation for the courts' failure to employ the usual rule stems,
apparently, from an unwillingness to recognize the Government as just
another contracting party. Several theories have been advanced in ex-
planation of why special rules of construction have been applied to Govern-
ment contracts, 2 but they all originate in the realization that the Govern-
ment is sovereign.2' The courts' attitude and the difficulties which it
theless desires to contract with the government, he may be held to have assumed the risk."
Naylor, supra note 9, at 593. The author concludes that the injustices to contractors that
may occur are necessary evils in order that the Government and the people as a whole
may benefit. Ibid.
26. See note 17 supra. "... ihe Government, as a contractor, has insisted on and
received favorable treatment in its contracting capacity which it would not receive under
ordinary principles of private contract law." Schultz, supra note 20, at 220.
27. See 3 CoanuIN, CONTRACTS § 559 (1951). The rules are but guides and not hard
and fast principles. This rule is used often in insurance contract cases. Id. § 559 n.10.
However, another rule of construction exists to the effect that the contract should be
construed in a manner most favorable to the public interest. Id. § 550. "Where govern-
ment is itself a party, application of this rule often runs counter to the one preferring a
construction that bears against the party in whose interest the contract language was
chosen." Ibid.
Corbin distinguishes these contradictory rules by calling the former a rule of inter-
pretation as to the parties and the latter a rule of construction pertaining to a certain
"legal effect" which is desirable. One affects the words of the contract; the other affects
the contract's operation. The argument could be made that the courts are not really
interpreting the provisions of the contract in favor of the Government but are construing
the entire contract so as to give it a legal effect beneficial to the public interest. Such
a contention must, of course, show the necessity for utilizing this rule of construction.
See note 29 infra.
28. For elaboration on several of these theories, see Note, 27 IND. L.J. 279, 283-284
(1952).
29. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1939) ; Horowitz v. United States, 267
U.S. 458 (1925) ; Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190 (1864). For a discussion of this
aspect see Naylor, mspra note 9, at 585-587.
The Government as sovereign and the Government as a contracting party are distinct
concepts. The Court of Claims has pointed out that: "The two characters which the
government possesses as a contractor and as a sovereign cannot be . . . fused; nor can
the United States while sued in the one character be made liable in damages for their
acts done in the other. Whatever acts the government may do, be they legislative or
executive, so long as they be public and general, cannot be deemed specially to alter,
modify, obstruct or violate the particular contracts into which it enters with private
persons." Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383, 384 (1865).
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creates are exemplified by the predicament of the subcontractor in this
contractual scheme.
The Government, being aware of the extensive subcontracting sys-
tem, is on notice that should it terminate or breach its contract many
parties besides the prime will be injured. Apparently this fact is recog-
nized, for in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation" a detailed
procedure is provided to protect the interests of the numerous subs as
well as primes in instances of contract termination for the Government's
convenience. 3 A similar provision exists in statutory form in regard to
cancellation of war contracts.32 But Governmental concern for sub-
contractors is evidenced only in these limited circumstances and even
here is not adequate."
The court indicated further that the liability of the Government can be no more than
a private defendant's liability. Id. at 384-385. Neither, by this token, should the liability
of the government be any less than a private individual's. The Government, then, as a
contracting party should be the same as any contracting party. This means relief from
liability should be measured with the identical tools that are used when a contract between
private individuals is involved: illegality, impossibility, and frustration, for example.
Rather than talk in nebulous language about "an act of sovereignty," it is more precise
to demand that the Government as a defendant show how "an act of sovereignty" brings
about the requisite illegality, impossibility, or frustration.
In Hamilton Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Greater New York Carpet House, 47 N.Y.S.2d 210
(1944) the court translated .a ruling of the War Production Board which prevented per-
formance of the contract into the doctrine of frustration which was then held to be a
good defense to a breach of contract claim. This approach is a move toward making the
Government contract a private contract. It is submitted that this is a sounder approach.
A caveat should be added that the entire preceding discussion might require a break-
down of the Government contract according to its nature. Thus it should be determined
whether the contract is essentially commercial in character or one primarily for the public
benefit and service. See Friedmann, Changing Functions of Contract in the Common
Law, 9 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 15, 33-37 (1951).
30. 32 ConE FED. REG. §§ 400.112-415a.4 (Cum. Supp. 1953). The Armed Service
Procurement Regulation shall be referred to as ASPR in the remainder of this Note;
section numbers refer to the Code of Federal Regulations.
31. 32 CODE FED. REG. §§ 407.100-407.712 (Cum. Supp. 1953). Section 407.518 deals
with the settlement of subcontract claims. As illustration, § 407.518-3 suggests that the
prime contractor include in all subcontracts a termination clause so as to prevent suits by
subs against the prime. Nevertheless, judgments by subs against the prime are recog-
nized as the cost of settling with these subs in certain instances. See § 407.518-8. For a
discussion of the termination of contracts section of the ASPR see Hardee, Termination
of Military Contracts, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 172 (1953).
32. 63 STAT. 380 (1949) ; 41 U.S.C. § 107 (1952). For a recent case coming under
this act, see Erie Basin Metal Products v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 402 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
This statute applies only to the termination of war contracts.
33. For an analytical exposition of the ASPR which points up some of the in-
adequacies of the current regulation, see Wienshienk and Feldman, The Current Challenge
of Military Contract Termination, 66 HARv. L. REv. 47 (1952).
The subcontractors may bear greater risks than primes in cases of termination for
. the subcontractor must ordinarily rely upon the continued solvency of the prime
whereas payment to the prime is assured...." Id. at 52.
Another area in which the government has taken an interest concerning the position
of subcontractors has to do with the practice of bid-shopping by primes. Some primes
will use bids of subcontractors in making up their bid to the government, and, then, after
NOTES
When the government breaches its contract, the subcontractor's
position is even more precarious than in cases of termination. Due to
the lack of privity, the sub cannot recover against the Government."'
Even where the Government, in its contract with the prime, reserved
control over the subs, the Court of Claims in Continental Illinois National
Bank and Trust Co. v. United States5 denied relief because these provi-
sions only almost created privity." Moreover, the existence of statutory
and administrative regulations" applicable to subs, albeit in restricted
fashion, makes more feasible the contention that privity does exist. Yet
the courts are generally unwilling to broaden, even slightly, the tradi-
tional concept."
Of course, the subcontractor would need no remedy against the
Government if his rights against the prime proved satisfactory, but
there are circumstances in which he has no adequate remedy. The prime
getting the government contract shop around for lower subcontract bids. See Joint
Hearing before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S.848, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
34. Petrin v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 670 (1940) ; Herfurth v. United States, 89
Ct. Cl. 122 (1939). But cf. Corum v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 728 (Ct. Cl. 1949) ;
Maneely v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 623 (1929). In the two latter cases recovery was
granted to subs because of certain contract provisions which the court interpreted as
providing the necessary privity.
In the area of private contract law, also, the sub cannot by-pass the prime and sue
the owner. Lack of privity precludes recovery. Baker v. McMurry Contracting Co., 282
Mo. 685, 223 S.W. 45 (1920) ; Marks v. Indianapolis B. and W. Ry. Co., 38 Ind. 440
(1871).
35. 81 F. Supp. 596 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
36. The contract provisions quoted by the court were:
"1 . . . The Contractor shall not award any work to any subcontractor without
prior written approval of the Contracting Officer and the terms of all subcontracts shall
be subject to the prior approval of the Contracting Officer.
"2. The Contractor shall be as fully responsible to the Government for the acts and
omissions of subcontractors and of persons either directly or indirectly employed by them,
as he is for the acts and omissions of persons directly employed by him.
"3. The Contractor shall cause appropriate provisions to be inserted in all subcon-
tracts relative to the work to bind subcontractors to the contractor by the terms of the
General Conditions and other Contract Documents insofar as applicable to the work of
subcontractors .. . and to give the Contractor the same power as regards terminating
any subcontract that the Government may exercise over the Contractor under any pro-
visions of the Contract Documents ...
"4. Nothing contained in the Contract Documents shall create any contractual rela-
tion between any subcontractor and the Government." Id. at 597-598.
37. In some instances the statute will apply directly to subs; in other instances the
statute may be directed to the prime requiring him to include in his subcontracts certain
provisions or to take certain action pertaining to the subcontracts. In still other instances,
the statute may simply be suggestive as to a course to be followed. Regulations follow
a similar pattern. E.g., ASPR, § 407.518-2 (directed to the sub) ; § 407.518-12 (directed
to the prime) ; § 407.518-3 (suggested to the prime). See Feldman, supra note 14.
38. In Corum v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 728 (Ct. Cl. 1949) and Maneely v.
United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 623 (1929) the wording of the Government contracts gave so
much control that the subs were given the right to sue the Government on them. See also
the provisions in note 36 supra.
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is often in a superior bargaining position. This may result because he is
a large, well-established business or because he has the Government con-.
tract as tempting bait to wave before a prospective sub. By utilizing
this bargaining position, the prime is frequently able to include in the
subcontract an exculpatory provision relieving him from liability if the
Government breaches its contract. 9 Some jurisdictions, under certain
circumstances, even hold that the prime is not liable to subs notwith-
standing the absence of an exculpatory clause.4"
In these instances the courts have consistently denied recovery to the
prime for the amounts which would have gone to the subs in the absence
of such a clause. 1 Such a determination, however, cannot be attained
under general contract law and constitutes another exception in favor of
the Government. The liability of the Government is limited by the prime
contract; however, when the prime sues for damages, the Court of Claims
considers the subcontract's exculpatory provision. This results in the
Government's liability being measured by the prime contract and the
damages being gauged by the entire contractual scheme-subcontracts in-
cluded. This, obviously, violates the rule that liability and damages
should be determined by the same criteria.2
If the court were to grant proper damages, the prime would be "un-
justly" enriched" by the amount that, in the absence of such a clause,
would go to the sub, but this enrichment is not to the Government's detri-
ment but to the sub's. By refusing recovery the court has decided that
39. For Government breaches the exculpatory clause for subcontracts might read
something like this: The contractor shall not in any event be held responsible for any
loss, damage, detention or delay caused by the owner.
40. See Philadelphia Boiler Works v. Foundation Co., 190 N.Y. Supp. 696, 697
(1921) in which the court said: "Both parties having had in view the contingency that
performance might not be permitted by the United States, it was an implied part of their
agreement that if performance was prevented by the government both were to be released
from subsequent obligation." See also Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N.Y. 489, 44 N.E. 167
(1896) ; Union Paving Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 95 Pa. Super. 342 (1928).
Whether the prime is liable to the sub in instances of breach or termination by the
Government depends upon who assumes the risk of the Government's breach or termina-
tion. See 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1932 (2d ed. 1938) ; 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1340
(1951) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 457 (1932).
41. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 101 F. Supp.
755 (Ct. Cl. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 963 (1952) ; Continental Illinois National Bank
and Trust Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 596 (Ct. Cl. 1949) ; Severin v. United States,
99 Ct. Cl. 435 (1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 733 (1944). See also 1 MERCER L. REv. 117
(1949), 34 MINN. L. REv. 143 (1950).
42. See discussion of the relationship of liability and damages in Patterson, Builder's
Measure of Recovery for Breach of Contract, 31 COL. L. REv. 1286 (1931).
43. Whether or not the prime is "unjustly" enriched depends on whether or not the
exculpatory clause was bargained for or forced upon the sub because of the prime's
superior bargaining position. Even if such a clause is a result of a superior bargaining
position, it might be contended that recovery from the Government is not an "unjust"
enrichment.
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of the two undeserving parties-the Government and the prime-the
former shall retain the amount. If the equities were equal, such a con-
clusion would be just, but they are not because the Government owes this
money under ordinary contract principles.44 The court, therefore, refuses
to apply an exception to the general contract law and thereby permit re-
covery by the sub when he sues the Government directly, but it does find
an exception and deny partial recovery when the prime sues the Govern-
ment. The consistency of the court's approach lies basically in its solici-
tude for the Government. In cases where no exculpatory clause exists,
the court does permit recovery by the prime for the sub's benefit before
the latter has obtained a judgment against the prime or even instituted
an action.45
44. Just what the measure of damages is in cases of delay or suspension by the
Government appears to be a subject of uncertainty. The Court of Claims has indicated
that where a subcontractor is the real party who loses and the prime is not liable to the
sub because of an exculpatory clause, the prime has lost nothing and can recover nothing.
Pope v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 436 (1932). See a like holding in Degnon Contracting
Co. v. City of New York, 235 N.Y. 481, 139 N.E. 580 (1923).
The Court of Claims in a more recent holding said: "Plaintiffs [prime contractors]
therefore had the burden of proving, not that someone suffered actual damages from
the defendant's breach of contract, but that they, plaintiffs, suffered actual damages."
Severin v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 435, 443 (1943). But the Court of Claims has ex-
pressed a more satisfactory view in an 1875 case: "In estimating the damages caused
by this suspension of the work, both parties have gone . . . upon the actual expenditures
of the contractor to his subcontractors. . . . We do not understand this to be the rule
for measuring the damages in such cases. The Government is a stranger to the sub-
contractors . . . and is not interested in the amounts paid to them. If the contractor had
paid to them three or four times as much as the necessities of this case required, the
Government would not be liable for such excess; and if they had waived all claims upon
the contractor, or compounded with him for a nominal consideration, his good fortune
would not have enabled the Government to throw off its own liabilities. The instructions
which should be given to a jury in such a case, we apprehend, would be not to inquire into
the private or ex-parte transactions of this contractor, but to estimate the natural and
inevitable losses caused to any contractor by such a suspension. . . . Smith v. United
States, 11 Ct. Cl. 707, 710 (1875), aff'd, 94 U.S. 214 (1876) (emphasis supplied).
The damages arising, admittedly, are speculative and must be estimated. See 6
CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 1094 (1951). Such estimate need not be itemized. United States
v. Smith, 94 U.S. 214 (1876).
As a practical matter once the Government has paid for its breach to the prime it
then may let the prime and the subs settle among themselves. If a sub-assuming privity
exists-were later to sue on the contract, the Government could plead as a defense the
judgment to the prime which completely covered the Government's liability for the breach.
45. Pneumatic Gun-Carriage and Power Co. v. United States, 36 Ct. Cl. 71 (1901).
Judge Whaley stated in a dissent to another case: "For fifty years it has been the
settled doctrine of this court that a contractor could bring suit for himself and his sub-
contractor for losses occasioned by delay by the defendant before payment was made
to the subcontractor." Severin v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 435, 444 (1943).
Any assumption by the Court of Claims that the sub will exercise its right is
negated, however, by the statement: "I think that in most of the suits involving wrongs
committed by Government agents to the harm of subcontractors, there would be no ground
on which the prime would, in fact, be liable to the subcontractor. Yet we consistently
allow recovery in such cases without first trying the hypothetical suit of the subcontractor
against the prime contractor. We do not allow recovery because we presume the ex-
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The Court of Claims, itself, has been split on this issue of whether
the prime, when not liable on the subcontract, should recover for the
sub. One judge, Madden, has even reversed his position. Writing for
the majority in Severin v. United States46 which denied recovery to a
subcontractor and then dissenting from a similar denial of recovery in
Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Co. v. United States,47 he stated that
he would be glad to see the Severin case overruled for it ". . . introduces
to [sic] large an element of the accidental into our decisions in these fre-
quently recurring cases involving subcontractors."4  A rationale sug-
gested by Judge Madden would have the prime hold in trust for the sub a
right to have the Government comply with its contract.
Several alternative solutions to the subs' problem are available. The
court could broaden the concept of privity to permit them to recover.
This would consist of just another exception to the general contract law ;o
however, such an exception would be a novelty since it benefits the subs
and not the Government. Utilization of a third party beneficiary theory
enabling the subs to sue directly would constitute a lesser departure from
accepted contract principles.5'
istence of such liability." Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. United
States, 81 F. Supp. 596, 599 (Ct. CI. 1949).
Recovery by the prime from the Government has no relation to recovery by the
sub from the prime. See Baker v. McMurry Contracting Co., 282 Mo. 685, 223 S.W.
45 (1920).
46. 99 Ct. CI. 435 (1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 733 (1944).
47. 81 F. Supp. 596, 598 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
48. Id. at 599.
49. Ibid. This suggestion is commented on and an alternative suggestion offered in
34 MINN. L. REv. 143, 145 (1950). Both proposals recognize the subcontractors' dilemma
and are attempts to clarify it.
Judge Madden cites United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730 (1944) as providing a new
rule in regard to recovery by a prime for the benefit of a sub in the face of an exculpatory
clause. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp.
596, 598 (1949). However, the Blair case had to do with extra costs and services de-
manded by the government. In "damage" cases no benefit accrues to the Government;
in "extras" cases the Government does receive the benefit. Recovery by the prime in the
latter instance is based on an implied contract. An exculpatory clause with the sub-
contractor relating to "damages" would seem to be immaterial in these implied contract
cases. Furthermore, there was no evidence introduced that an exculpatory clause did
exist in the Blair case. Id. at 737. See also Leary Construction Co. v. United States, 63
Ct. Cl. 206 (1927) (money was admittedly owed to prime; hence prime-sub relationship
immaterial). However, though Blair can be explained away, a similar argument can be
made where the suit is one for damages. In both cases the suit is on the contract.
It is worth mentioning that in cases where damages are sought for delay, the re-
covery, though in contract, seems to border on tort damages. The Government, it could
be maintained, has interfered with an advantageous relationship of both the prime and
the sub and is liable to both. Note the language of the court in Smith v. United States,
11 Ct. Cl. 707, 710 (1875) quoted in note 44 supra.
50. See note 17 supra. See also discussion in the text at pp. 73-74 infra.
51. Maneely v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 623 (1929). Here the contract between
the Government and the prime contained a clause which established the Government's
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The simplest and most candid approach the court can pursue is to
follow the general contract law with a stricter adherence. Accordingly,
the prime would recover the amounts that belong to the subs, and, if
necessary, a court of equity could then require him to compensate them
thereby preventing unjust retention by the prime.5" This would not vio-
late the subcontract's exculpatory clause because it only concerns the
contract liability of the prime and has no pertinence to recovery received
by the prime for the sub's benefit.5" The prime would serve as a con-
structive trustee of such amounts due the subs.5 Utilization of this
constructive trust scheme should be distinguished from Judge Madden's
proposal. "5 Reliance on the trust concept is certainly less speculative than
permitting recovery before a sub has even instituted an action against
the prime.
The problems in this area, as indicated, arise from the fact that pri-
vate contractors who engage the Government face a double blast of dis-
advantages in that they must accept a standard contract prepared by the
Government and can expect a court interpretation of this contract favor-
able to that entity. It might be contended that the solution lies in a modi-
fication of the law by which the Government-specified contract is in-
terpreted. This implies that the important realization is that the primes'
and the subs' problems are not isolated instances of injustices but are ex-
amples of what the Government's one-sided contract engenders-a result
of the trend from contract to status.55 The conclusion, then, is not that
the general contract law is inadequate, per se, but that these situations do
not always fit within its scope.57 Thus it is urged that a new law is needed
liability to third parties; for this the prime gave up his claim against the Government.
See also Nemmers, supra note 14. See note 50 supra.
52. This is Judge Whaley's approach as suggested in the dissenting opinion in
Severin v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 435, 445 (1943).
53. This point is brought out in 34 MINN. L. Rav. 143, 145 (1950). The sub-
contract would seem to be beyond consideration when a prime sues the government on its
prime contract. What relevancy can the one have on the other? See notes 44 and 49
supra.
54. See 3 Scorf, TRuSTS § 462.2 (1939).
55. See note 49 supra. Judge Madden would have the prime hold a "right" in trust;
whereas under this approach an "amount of recovery" would be held in trust.
56. See Goble, Trends in the Theory of Contracts in the United States, 11 TULANE
L. Rv. 412 (1937) ; see also note 21 supra.
"Contract" implies rights and duties that are bargained for; "status" refers to rights
and duties that arise from a relationship that has become established other than by con-
tract. Where a contract becomes so one-sided that little room exists for bargaining,
the relationship borders on being one of status.
57. "The common law systems are thus gradually coming to grips with the problem
of infiltration of public law into contract, within the confines of the common law itself;
but it can hardly be denied that the absence of a clear-cut system of administrative law
and tribunals greatly impedes and retards the clarification of this increasingly important
branch of the law." Friedmann, supra note 29, at 37. Another writer states, ". . . [T]he
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to cover the Government's "contract of adhesion." Proponents of this
view might further suggest that the new law take the form of control by
an administrative agency.5" Flexibility and informality would then pre-
vail, and the interests of the contractors would, perhaps, be better guarded.
Such a change appears satisfactory as an abstract notion, but it is
not a practical, immediate answer." Legislative action on controversial
subjects is slow. The effects on business practices must, of course, be
ascertained, and contractors would probably distrust such wholesale in-
novations. Furthermore, the drastic nature of this proposal encourages
examination of other, less revolutionary solutions.
Alternatively, the position could be maintained that a satisfactory
solution lies in a change of philosophy by the courts toward the Govern-
ment. Such a new philosophy, one favoring the contractor, would be
expressed through a liberal interpretation of the contract in his behalf.
Contemporaneously with the contract to status movement there has been
a counter-movement from status to contract which provides elasticity in
the contract relationship.6" This counter-movement which is court spon-
sored, involves, for example, freer application of constructive conditions,
an extended use of the third-party beneficiary theory, a more liberal
utilization of parol evidence-all in the direction of molding the contract
to fit the supposed true intent of the parties. The advocates of this posi-
tion seem to imply that many of the injustices which arise because of the
Government's standard form contract may be alleviated by flexible and
equitable interpretation of contracts by the courts. This means that the
courts would continue to create exceptions to the general law but only
where necessary to equalize the inequitable effects of the existing standard
contract. Inherent in such a view is the recognition that the sovereign
need not be protected in the manner it is today.
This proposal which embodies an extended reversal by the courts of
their philosophy of interpretation of Government contracts coupled with
a utilization of exceptions 1 to the general law meets the same criticism
that today's approach of employing exceptions to favor the Government
use of the word 'contract' does not commit us to indiscriminate extension of the ordinary
contract rules to all contracts." Kessler, supra note 21, at 633.
58. See PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH
AND CONTINENTAL LAW 145 (1937). In the areas where administrative control is utilized
today in the Government contract area there is need for revision. See, for example,
Anderson, supra note 22, at 51; Schultz, szpra note 20, at 246-250; Wienshienk and Feld-
man, supra note 33, at 80-82.
59. "While [administrative supervision] is to be welcomed, where available, its
availability in most of the fields concerned will be a long time in coming; and new fields
are constantly emerging." Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 705 (1939).
60. Goble, supra note 56, at 423-424.
61. See note 67 infra and accompanying text for a view on exceptions.
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faces; namely, it tends to undermine the "security," in the sense of pre-
dictability of actions at law, which the parties to a contract require.
Neither party could be sure that his words would be given the intended
meaning. 2 What may appear to be a one-sided, unjust contract may
actually have been bargained for. These possibilities should serve as a
check to the loose interpretation of contracts.
Though each of the two suggested approaches appears unsatisfactory
when standing alone, both contain ideas which may be extracted and
blended to form a tentative solution. First, a recognition is needed that
the movement from contract to status, that is, from free bargaining to a
standardized contract, is not intrinsically bad. On the contrary it is very
desirable in that it provides certainty, uniformity, and expeditious conduct
of business.63 The danger lies in that the certainty achieved may be un-
just to the person who must accept the standard form. Consequently,
what is required is a revised standard contract that is fair to all interested
parties. 4 This acknowledges that the standard contract is a natural con-
comitant to contemporary economic development and at the same time
assures a status relationship that is just. Secondly, the courts should
adopt a new philosophy, one which does not favor the Government.
Hence, the courts would not indulge in granting wholesale exceptions to
the Government. Utilization of exceptions to prevent obvious injustices
to either the contractors or the Government would be, of course, permis-
sable, but the revised standard contract should operate to keep such ex-
ceptions to a minimum. 5
In the absence of a revised contract, the courts should utilize excep-
tions sparingly. General contract law should still be followed with neither
party receiving special consideration.6" For example, a satisfactory solu-
62. According to Professor Llewellyn: "No man is safe when language is to be
read in the teeth of its intent." Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Per-
spective, 40 YALE L.. 704, 732 (1931).
63. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a standard form con-
tract, see Sales, supra note 21, at 337-342.
64. Sales suggests setting up a board consisting of lawyers, businessmen, and other
representatives to draft various standard contracts and clauses. A standard contract need
not be completely inflexible; certain clauses may be discretionary. Ibid.
65. If the standard contract should, in an instance, prove unjust or unworkable,
then the courts might have to apply an exception to prevent an injustice, but this should
then be the cue for a revision of the contract so as to preclude this problem arising
thereafter. The object is to reduce exceptions to the minimum.
66. "The delicate reconciliation of interests required can best be accomplished by
adherence to existing contract doctrine whenever possible, by intelligent legislative or
judicial adaptation of existing principles to new situations where necessary, and above
all, by a method of judicial decision which clearly presents the competing factors in a
controversy." Note, 27 IND. L.J. 279, 292 (1952).
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tion of the subcontractors' problem is better obtained by adhering to ac-
cepted contract principles, rather than by creating an additional exception
in favor of subcontractors.67 A revolutionary attempt at administrative
control of the Government contract need only be considered as a possible
alternative if the courts refuse to adopt this new outlook.
NONFEASANCE: A THREAT TO THE PROSECUTORS'
DISCRETION
It is generally conceded that punishment for the commission of a
criminal act is an effective means' of reducing the steadily increasing
crime rate in the United States.2 Under present criminal law standards,
however, there can be no punishment until there has been legal prosecution
and conviction.' Thus, the prosecution of criminal offenses becomes a
pivotal point in all attempts to reduce crime.
67. Two possible methods exist of overcoming the favorable exceptions granted to
the Government. One is to utilize another exception to counteract the first; second is to
neutralize the exception by adhering to general contract law. See notes 61 and 65 supra
and text.
1. "Punishment should be inflicted, firstly, because it is right to do so. But such
punishment may also have very useful effects: it may stimulate reformation by bringing
a wrongdoer to a realization of the ethical significance of his behavior; it may also deter.
Such punishment provides far-ranging instruction in the social values." HALL, PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW 130 (1947). See also Ewing, A Study on Punishment, 21 CAN. B. REv.
102, 116 (1943) ; Gausewitz, Considerations Basic to a New Penwl Code, 11 Wis. L. REv.
346, 353 (1936) ; Note, Punishment and Moral Responsibility, 7 MOD. L. REv. 205 (1944).
The modern proponent of deterministic behaviorism is likely to object to punishment
of any sort, preferring the view that society, and not the violator of the law, is the sinner
or that the criminal is sick and should be treated accordingly. See MENNINGER, THE
HUMAN MIND (1945); WHITE, CRIME AND CRIMINALS (1933).
2. In 1952, crime in cities increased 8.1 percent, showing gains in all offenses for
the first time in seven years. This was a general rise in crime of 8.2 percent over the
1951 figures. 23 UNIF. CR. REP. 71 (1952). The first six months of 1953 showed a 2.5
percent increase over the same period in the preceding years and a 9.0 percent increase
over that period of 1951. 24 UNIF. CR. REP. 1 (1953). Since 1950, there has been a 20
percent increase in the crime rate in contrast with a population rise of only 6 percent.
The Indianapolis Star, April 22, 1954, p. 20, col. 1.
Prior to 1951, the crime problem in the United States was serious enough to warrant
national attention. KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA (1951).
3. This idea is embodied in what Professor Hall calls the "principle of legality" and
defines as the "limitation on penalization by officials, effected by the required prescrip-
tion and application of specific rules." HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 19 (1947).
The principle, which springs from an ultimate concept of justice, expresses itself in the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The general process of prosecution embraces the activities of several law enforce-
ment agencies; i.e., police, prosecutor, jury, and judge. Traditionally, the initial charge
against an alleged offender is made by the police, and, then, carried to the prosecutor or
the grand jury. In most jurisdictions either of these agencies may institute prosecution
